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Judging Bush's foreign policy - and Obama's

Steve Walt issued a 14-point indictment of George W. Bush's foreign policy, and Will Inboden issued a response. Both are found in Foreign Policy's website .

Like Imboden, I think Walt is wrong to say Bush should have done more about Bin Laden before 9/11. That is a case of hindsight and wishful thinking. Every disaster is followed by a chorus of "we should have known better."

I also think Bush should get some credit for the lack of a major terrorist attack against the U.S. after 9/11. But some perspective is also needed. Bin Laden and his network were dangerous, but they were not as rich or as powerful as many small nations. The U.S. should not brag about preventing Libya or Khazakstan from mounting serious attacks on the U.S. But if an aggressive Libya or Khazakstan dominates our foreign policy for a decade, we should be embarassed. That is what happened with Al Queda.

Bush's foreign policy was a disaster for one reason: He started an unnecessary war in Iraq. Even Bush's public reasons for beginning that war (WMD and Iraqi links to Al Queda) were not sufficient reasons to go to war. His public reasons turned out to be illusions (ie, he saw what he wanted to see). Bush's real reason for going to war (re-making the map of the Middle East) was a pipe dream. The war has cost lives and immense treasure. The real cost, though, was the cost it exacted on all other foreign policy objectives.

The pragmatic difficulty of carrying on two major military interventions left us with little leverage in the rest of the world. Other bad foreign policy news during the Bush administration (Russia's growing influence on its neighbors, lack of progress in the Middle East, North Korea's assertiveness, and Iran's assertiveness) was a result of the opening created by our preoccupation with two wars. One of the most unreported aspects of Iran's foreign policy is that they could not be so bold if Saddam Hussein, their mortal enemy, was still on their border.

Imboden says it was important for Bush to 'narrow' the anti-terror effort to a "war on terror" so that Muslims would not feel targeted. Imboden wears the same blinders that Bush did. Bush should have narrowed the effort much further by declaring war only on Al Queda. Nobody thinks Muslims were impressed with Bush's choice of phrases but forgot that Bush invaded two Muslim nations.

A history with no invasion of Iraq would have permitted success in Afganistan. Some of the effort that has poured into the Iraqi quagmire could have been used to bolster our alliances with important regional (Muslim) players like Turkey. And a more successful Afganistan would mean a more stable Pakistan.

Imboden also defends Bush by stating that Obama has continued many of Bush's policies. This is Imboden's most naive statement. Obama did not have the option to make the Iraq occupation disappear, or to go back in time and focus on Afganistan, or to undo the momentum Iran, Russia, and North Korea have enjoyed while the U.S. was distracted.

Obama's options in foreign policy were very limited. Had he abruptly made changes, it would have been wreckless--he might have even been accused of cowboy diplomacy. Obama is more pragmatic. Foreign policy requires time and intelligence.

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